Building Heavenly Kingdom on Earth: 
The Roman Catholic Church and Deepening Democracy in Brazil and South Korea

LAI Yan Ho

[ABSTRACT] Democratic consolidation, which follows democratization, consists of both institutionalisation and internationalization of democratic norms and values in the state and society, and individual citizens as well. Civil society therefore plays a major role in ‘deepening democracy’ through civil engagement, empowerment of citizenship and multiple forms of democratic practices.

The Catholic Church was regarded as an active force favouring liberal democracies during the third wave of democratisation. However, the literature on the roles of Roman Catholic Church in deepening democracy needs to be expanded. This article discusses the role of the Catholic Church in deepening democracy by a comparative analysis between the Church in Brazil and South Korea. The Catholic Church, as a member of civil society, contributes to deepening democracy by its own doctrine, which frames the justification of its social and political involvement, its resources for mobilizations, and its strategies that utilise political opportunities at both the national and local level. It also cooperates and builds coalitions with many local NGOs and even religious organizations for a greater influence in their social and political engagements. By comparing the behaviours of the Catholic Church in South Korea and
Brazil, the author highlights that, apart from the strategies and size of the faithful, three modes of dynamics are essential to continue the field of study, i.e. the relationship between the national and local levels of the Catholic Church, the inter-religious relationships and the relationship between state, business and religion.

Introduction

Roman Catholic Church has long been involved in politics, and the discussion of church-state relations has lasted centuries. In recent decades, the Roman Catholic Church involves herself in public affairs as a religion in society, and is independent of any state apparatus. She was regarded as an active force favouring liberal democracies after her renewal in the Second Vatican Council, of which the Church advocates human rights and social justice as a mission. She was even viewed as successful in fostering movements for “third wave” democratisation. In short, she is working on the mission of building heavenly kingdom on Earth.

This article continues the debate on the role of Catholic Church in “post-democratisation” era, in particular her relations with other societal actors striving for the same goal. In this article comparative method is used. It compares the Catholic Church in Brazil and South Korea, and reasons are threefold. Firstly, the Catholic Church’s support was instrumental in the democratisation of Brazil in 1985 and South Korea in 1987. Both countries were experienced

---

democratic transition due to the resurrection of civil society and frequent mobilisation against the state. The Catholic Church supported the democratic movement which brought the collapse of military regimes. Secondly, both the Brazilian and South Korean Catholic Churches have popular local organisations engaging in public affairs. The outstanding examples are the Base Ecclesial Communities (Comunidades Eclesiais de Base / CEB) and Catholic Priests’ Association for Justice (CPAJ) in South Korea. Thirdly, the countries differ in the proportion of the Catholic faithful in the population. According to the Brazilian Institute of Statistics and Geography, around 65% of total population in Brazil claimed to be Catholic in 2010. Yet in South Korea, even the latest census illustrates that Catholics only account for 10.3% of the total population.

This article is divided into four parts. Part 1 reviews the literature on the key concepts of this article. Part 2 compare the work of Catholic Church in Brazil and South Korea, and their relations with various parties in deepening democracy of their countries. Part 3 evaluates the comparative study in a comprehensive sense. Part 4 concludes the article with an invitation for further relevant research.

3 For those who are interested in the political history of the two countries can be found in the list of Further Readings at the end of this article.
Democratic Consolidation, Deepening Democracy and Civil Society

Democratic consolidation, deepening democracy and civil society are key concepts in this article. Democratic consolidation refers to democratic survival, i.e. to avoid democratic breakdown and democratic erosion. Its original idea focuses on the institutional rearrangement of a state after the democratic transition. A broader concept of democratic consolidation regards democratic consolidation as the second stage of democratic transition. The second stage of democratic transition is completed only if democratic procedures are extended to social institutions, and substantial equality is achieved. It also emphasises the internalisation of democracy. Linz and Stepan suggest that a democratic regime is consolidated when a large majority of the public holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern a society.

For “deepening democracy”, it concerns democratic values, norms and practice beyond an institutional perspective. Bandyopadhyay defined deepening democracy as enabling citizens to exercise deeper control over public decisions by participation and

---

involvement. Although the institutional design constrains the political space of civic engagement and determines the scope of democratic practices, how democratic rules and values can be utilised is dependent on the behaviours of individual citizens and civil society groups.

This article adopts the concept ‘deepening democracy’ instead of ‘democratic consolidation’. Internalisation of democratic norms and values in social and private spheres may be sufficient requisites to consolidate democratic culture and practice, but they are not necessary for securing democratic institutions and preventing authoritarian reversal. However, such internalisations from the roots are necessary if the quality of democracy is to be raised, in terms of citizenship and the individual’s engagement in civil society. The idea of deepening democracy is therefore more appropriate than a broad concept of democratic consolidation of institutional arrangements in the research.

Lastly, civil society is a public sphere in which non-state activities and autonomous social organisations can flourish and be independent of the state. There are two models of civil society. In the ‘critical’ model, the absence of government intervention guarantees the independent capacity of the civil society to check and maintain the balance of a democratic state power. Another is the ‘solidarity’ model. It aims at consolidating individual citizens and social groups to deepen democratic values and achieve common good. It is a public space for citizens and a public sphere of social interactions among

---

10 Vikas Jha, Bhavita Vaishnava and Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay, Citizen Leadership: Deepening Democratic Accountability in India, Brazil and South Africa (New Delhi, India: Academic Foundation, 2011).
citizens carrying a public role without government involvement.\textsuperscript{12} Once a strong social fabric is built with democratic culture, which internalises social actors on different levels, not only does it consolidate political democracy, but also deepens the quality of the democracy.\textsuperscript{13} This model of civil society contributes to deepening democracy when democratic norms and values are institutionalised in civic associations. According to Tocqueville and Putnam, flourishing civic associations promote democratic culture, enhance social capital and civic engagement in public good, build up a sense of common well-being, and thus consolidate democracy.\textsuperscript{14} This is an extension of the democracy to private associations and social groups, and is essential to deepening democracy.

This article regards deepening democracy as a bottom-up process driven by civil society, of which the Catholic Church plays a role in it. The purposes of deepening democracy from civil society are twofold. The first is to internalize democratic norms and values among citizens to create a sustainable democratic culture for the next generation. The second is to prevent alienation of democracy due to power abuse. The possibility of an authoritarian reversal is low in mature democratic states, yet an alienation of democracy is possible. Civil society carries a duty to resist state power abuse and


consolidate democratic culture from the bottom of a democratic regime.

Civil society deepens democracy through its organizations and mobilizations. Organizations are essential to the education of individual citizens on civic engagement and different forms of democratic participation, while mobilizations empower citizens and civil groups through a collective exercise of civil and political rights in public arena. There are three elements of deepening democracy by civil society. They are ‘civic engagement’, ‘empowerment of citizenship’ and ‘multiple forms of democratic practice’. Firstly, civic engagement refers to the participation of citizens in public affairs and organizations in the public domain. Secondly, empowerment of citizenship refers to the building up of the citizens’ capacity to exercise their civil liberties and democratic rights. Thirdly, ‘multiple forms of democratic practice’ means that civil society deepens democracy by practicing different kinds of democracy apart from the classical electoral form.

Deepening Democracy in Brazil and South Korea

Three approaches are adopted for analysis of Brazil and South Korea in both national and local levels. The first approach concerns the Catholic Church’s own behaviours in deepening democracy. They are categorized as ‘ecclesial action’. I adopt some categories from social movement concepts. They are ‘framing’, ‘resource mobilization’, and ‘political opportunity’. With regard to ‘framing’, the Catholic Church adopted pro-democratic discourses to justify their participation in democratization after Vatican II. The idea of resources mobilization is also applied to analyse how the Catholic Church utilises her resources to mobilize campaigns in civil society and to promote democratic norms and values. In light of political
opportunities, the Catholic Church promotes democracy by cooperation with friendly political parties or groups.\textsuperscript{15}

The second approach concerns a horizontal relation between the Catholic Church, civil society organizations or NGOs, and other religions, especially the Protestant Churches. I term it as ‘ecclesial-societal relations’.

The third approach concerns the relations within the Catholic Church per se. I term it as ‘intra-ecclesial relations’. Like a state, the Church has both national and local levels in her administration. The National Catholic Church is usually led by a group of bishops in their National Bishops Conferences. The local Catholic Church consists of parishes, local church communities and ecclesiastical organizations. There are sometimes tensions between the Churches on the two levels, in particular on social and political issues.

\textit{National Ecclesial Action}

National Conference of Bishops in Brazil (CNBB) is the highest authority of the Catholic Church in Brazil. Despite the change in political context, a rise of rival churches and the change of Vatican’s attitude towards the role of Church in Brazil, CNBB remains its contribution to Brazilian democracy in threefold.

Firstly, CNBB reframes its discourse on social and political engagement after democratic transition. CNBB realised that after a tough political era, it has to justify its continuing participation in Brazilian political and social affairs and to make the public realise that the Church would not support a particular side of political parties. Thus, it restructured its mission with regards to Brazilian contexts and Catholic Social Teaching. In 1997, CNBB issued a National

Episcopal Document ‘Way to the New Millennium: 1997-2000’, to restate principle of option for the poor and human rights.\textsuperscript{16} Between 2008 and 2013, more than a quarter of CNBB statements (25 out of 101) were concerned with political, economic, ecclesial ethics of life and environmental issues.\textsuperscript{17} CNBB became a ‘watchdog’ for Brazilian Catholics and civil society to broaden their social awareness to other fields apart from the political economy.\textsuperscript{18}

Secondly, CNBB promotes civic engagements and citizenry empowerment thought mobilisations with its ecclesial resources. Episcopal Commission of Charity, Justice and Peace is the core unit of CNBB responsible for social engagement of the Church at national level, in order to fulfill its role as the ‘prophetic voice of God's Kingdom and the social pastor questioning unjust structures of society.’\textsuperscript{19} Every year during Lent, the commission organises ‘Fraternity Campaign’\textsuperscript{20} to raise awareness of social issues. Activities of the campaign include poster competition, spreading of thematic messages, seminars, donations and social action. In recent years, CNBB and the Commission also organised Brazilian Social

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
Week to educate Brazilian Catholics on social ethics and missions, and to promote greater civil participation in society.\textsuperscript{21} Moreover, CNBB has long supported and sponsored local secular organisations fighting against land policies of the state, such as ‘Movement of the Landless’ and ‘Land of Pilgrimage’.\textsuperscript{22}

Thirdly, CNBB makes use of the Brazilian election campaign to deepen democratic values and practices. During elections, CNBB issued documents and statistics to influence citizens. In 1986, they issued ‘For a New Constitutional Order’ before the first election. They abstained from endorsing candidates, but urged voters to select individual candidates whose profile illustrated a firm stance on moral issues, described by the Church. Despite some progressive clergies endorsing various candidates in local constituencies, the bishops maintained their impartiality in the election campaign.\textsuperscript{23} During the latest election campaign in 2012, CNBB also opened a campaign called ‘Vote Awareness in 2012 Election’ (VOTO CONSCIENTE - ELEIÇÕES 2012), providing guidelines, radio spots, video clips and printed materials spread among dioceses and parishes to educate Catholics and Brazilian citizens to exercise their civic awareness in public issues as well as their political rights.\textsuperscript{24}

In South Korea, CBCK continues its concern on the politics and social affairs of the country after democratisation, continuing to


\textsuperscript{22} Serbin, pp.151.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid, pp.152.


- 182 -
deepen South Korean democracy by addressing and framing social issues to the public audience, promoting public deliberation with its resources and making use of political opportunities to promote democratic values.

Firstly, CBCK frames its religious doctrine with social issues to attract awareness and promote citizenry empowerment. The Church often addresses their issues of concern on particular Sundays during the year, which is when most Catholics gather in parishes and churches. An example is Farmer’s Sunday, which is an annual occasion for inviting farmers to speak in Catholic mass throughout the dioceses and parishes across the nation. The farmers are encouraged to speak in parishes, and use the pulpit to garner support for farmlands affected by the influx of inexpensive, imported agricultural products.\(^{25}\) CBCK also issues statements to express their positions and advice on different annual occasions, such as World Day of the Migrants and Refugees, Human Rights Day and Day for the Environment.\(^{26}\) This provides a platform on which much discussion can occur as it publicly declares the Church’s position on social and political issues.

Secondly, CBCK set up Episcopal Commission for Social Affairs, which is one of the four top standing Episcopal Commissions in CBCK, initiates most public engagements on behalf of the national Catholic Church.\(^{27}\) The commission publishes books on Church’s teachings related to social issues, celebrates ‘Social


\(^{26}\) All the statements are freely available at: <http://english.cbck.or.kr/news> [Accessed on 19 Aug 2013].

Doctrine Week’, to distribute instructional materials including the fundamental concepts for social doctrine and the special prayer texts to each diocese and parish, in order to extend civic education and raise awareness of parishioners.\(^{28}\) It also uses a gentle approach to promote its concerns and social engagements, such as organising concert for abolition of the death penalty in 2011,\(^{29}\) and open seminars discussing the limits of government power in 2009.\(^{30}\)

Thirdly, CBCK also makes use of the political opportunities during Korean elections to address democratic values and the social issues concerned. In his Lentern Message of 2010, the archbishop of Seoul also asked people to properly exercise their voting rights and select candidates who will serve their people instead of their parties.\(^{31}\) Another example is the CBCK’s election questionnaire to the presidential candidates in 2012. On October 16 2012, they delivered a questionnaire to the major candidates for the 18th president of South Korea along with suggestions on public commitments of the candidates, including the right to life, freedom


of the press and protection of laborers. CBCK provides Korean society with an example which demands transparency and responsibility from potential political officials.

**Local Ecclesial Action**

In the local level of Brazil, CEBs were the most significant forces in Brazilian democratization during 1970s and 1980s. Although the Church de-emphasized the confrontational strategy during 1990s, in 2000 CEBs still had 2% of the total population as its following, i.e. 2 million.

CEBs support local movement by its material and organisational resources. In the landless movement, CEBs have kept supporting the local peasants to form organisations since 1970s. Within the CEBs, landless peasants met regularly to discuss their problems and to devise ways of solving them with the assistances of CEB leaders. At the same time, each individual CEB was linked to other CEBs through a wide-ranging verbal communication network. The network not only served as ideal training grounds for social movement activists but also enabled different groups of landless peasants to communicate and thereby recognise that their grievances, though distinct, were highly complementary. In this way, the financial and organisational support provided by the Church was crucial in fostering the emergence of coordinated collective action among the landless in Brazil.

---


Furthermore, CEB transmitted its ecclesial legacy to Brazilian civil society since democracy was installed in the late 1980s. The new-born democracy provided opportunities for the growth of civil society organisations and political parties. It also brought many leaders who were active in CEBs to join trades unions, NGOs, social movements or even administrations run by Workers’ Party (PT) in various parts of the country. CEBs continue to exist, but have lost their avant-garde role in society.35

But it also implies the weakening influence of the CEBs. This is a result of the change of social context. After democratization was completed, the social atmosphere was far less contentious between the state and the Church. CEBs used to be the frontier organisations against the military state, but now its outstanding character does not fit Brazil that has formal democratic institutions and mechanisms nowadays. In addition, the spread of Pentecostal Protestantism made the Catholic Church responded with the introduction of Charismatic Renewal Movement, and made the radical approach of CEBs less popular. Maclean’s research proves that the CEBs’ high demands for commitment and participation of public affairs in new social circumstances had the paradoxical effect of driving members away, and Catholics found it difficult to take confrontational roles like CEBs in a wider society.36

In South Korea, the local church organisations advocate social and political issue in a more progressive way than that of Brazil. For the priests of CPAJ and local parishes, there are two main ways to mobilise collective actions and advocate their public concerns: religious mobilisation and social mobilisation.

Religious mobilisation refers to the actions in which the priestly activists use the religious ritual practices for social advocacy. They practice worship and liturgy such as prayer service, Mass and fast in public space to address social and political issues. The first example is the movement for abolition of the National Security Law. CPAJ holds Catholic Masses for abolition of the National Security Law every year. In 2004, nine CPAJ priests started their fast for the sake of abolishing that Law on 18th November until 1st December. They claimed themselves as fasting rather than doing hunger strike because they regarded their actions as a religious practice, fulfilling their ‘prophetic duty’ rather than activists’ pursuits.

Another example is an open-air Catholic Mass in response to a crackdown on building tenants, which was attributed to the ruthless removal action of the local Korean government. About 100 priests from CPAJ celebrated an open-air Mass in downtown Seoul to comfort family members of five tenants who died in the wake of the police action in Yongsan, central Seoul. About 1,000 people, not all of them Catholics attended, with some carrying placards that read "Brutal massacre, (President) Lee Myung-bak out" or "Stop the redevelopment project." Although these activities are religious in

---


39 Priests slam government, police in wake of crackdown on building tenants. UCANEWS, [Online] 4 Feb 2009. Available at:
nature, CPAJ priests also made use of the opportunity to address their concerns and discontent towards the government, and the participants’ placards coloured the ‘divine’ Catholic Mass with dimension of social advocacy as well.

In terms of social mobilisation, CPAJ and some local parishes mobilise their priests into social actions which has strong contentious elements and support local movement by their resources. For example, CPAJ and other activists protested against government proposal of the construction of a naval base which would harm the environment and increase regional tensions. In 2011, some activists including 11 diocesan priests trespassed on the construction site in a bid to block additional blasting by the company. At the end 16 activists and the priests were arrested. The priests were found guilty of obstructing police in the execution of their duties. Although the government had not changed its mind, the priests’ actions stimulated Korean society, and raise awareness of the problem of naval base construction.

Another example is the movement against the government proposal of building the first nuclear waste disposal site near a town. From July to December 2003, county residents in Wido have protested against the government proposal. The Catholic parish in the town backed up the movement. Most of the 1,000 parishioners have joined the candlelight rallies and offered its building and grounds to


40 Clergy demand release of protesters. UCANEWS, [Online] 13 March 2012. Available at:
accommodate protesters. At the end, the government took a step back in its plan to build a nuclear waste dump. One of the participant said that parishioners were not upset about the eruption of the activists in the parish as they felt proud “leading the protest”. This movement reveals how local Catholic parish supported citizens in social mobilisation, and empowered the parishioners to recognise and participate in public affairs.

Local Catholic organisations and parishes also form coalition for their mobilisations. Thus they can take it as a platform for exchange of resources and network, and thus expand the scope of struggle with injustice and the abusive governments. In 2004, twenty Catholic NGOs working with farmers held a joint press conference to demand the government prevent more imported rice from entering the Korean market. Besides, in 2012, the East Coast Solidarity for Anti-Nuke was formed by four Justice and Peace committees from their dioceses. In these coalitions, they enjoy moral legitimacy and

---


flexibility of mobilisation, as they have certain degree of autonomy from CBCK. This enables them to empower citizens through resources of the Church.

**National Ecclesial-societal Relations**

In Brazil, the monopoly of the Catholic Church as the opposition camp against the state was broken since new political parties, trade unions and NGOs were born after democratisation. Although influence of the Catholic Church diminishes, it has not left the socio-political circle completely.

CNBB takes many initiatives to work with NGOs on different social issues. Taking the issue of trafficking as an example, in 2010 the Human Mobility Sector of CNBB created a working group focused on the issue of trafficking in persons. This group consisted of approximately 15 institutions from both the Church and civil society. In 2011, CNBB again sponsored the second seminar for "identifying problems, indicators and actions taken to strengthen the pastoral coping with this reality in our country." On the issue of mining, in response to the new ‘Regulatory Framework of Mining’, CNBB invited entities, organisations and civil society movements to a meeting in the World Water Day in 2013. In the meeting, the Church representative stressed that the meeting was an initiative to create opportunities for dialogue and joint reflection with a view to

---


However, there aren’t any Protestant groups involved in such activities. This does not mean that the Protestant groups are not interested in public affairs; rather, they are influential in political election campaigns and party politics.\footnote{Feliciano, N. Ivette (2005) \textit{Politics, Pentecostals and Democratic Consolidation in Brazil}. [Online] Available at: <http://people.carleton.edu/~amontero/ivette%20feliciano.pdf> [Accessed on 21 Aug 2013]} The reason may lie in religious competition. Since the mid-1980s, Brazil experienced a Pentecostal boom while Roman Catholicism declined. Protestant ministers already outnumbered Catholic priests. Thus the Catholic Church no longer enjoyed its former pre-eminence in Brazilian society.\footnote{Madhvi Gupta, “Health Deficits and (the Absence of) Popular Mobilization in Brazil” \textit{Journal for Brazilian Studies} (2013, Vol. 2 Issue 1), pp. 169-201.} The Pentecostal growth threatens the major position of Catholic Church in Brazilian religion and society. The response to the Pentecostal threat is the promotion of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal, which is a Catholic lay movement exported from the United States in 1970s. The movement focuses on personal salvation and even pre-Vatican II spirituality, and its Pentecostal character becomes a way to compete with Pentecostal Protestantism.\footnote{Serbin, pp.153-4.}

The consequences of the widespread of charismatic movement in the Brazilian Catholic Church are twofold. Firstly, the movement
moved the national Church from liberationist and progressive side to a conservative one. This coincides with the removal of progressive Brazilian bishops by Pope John Paul II, who supported the Catholic Charismatic Renewal strongly. 

Secondly, the conservative character of the movement is influenced the local Catholic Church, so as to counteract the less progressive attitude it prior it developed since the democratisation period.

In South Korea, the CBCK’s also works with other religions and NGOs on national issues, yet to a smaller extent compared to the CNBB. The national campaign against capital punishment is an obvious example. In 2009, the Committee for Justice and Peace of the CBCK commemorated the event for World Day against the Death Penalty, in alliance with the Amnesty International South Korea, Catholic Human Rights Committee, and other religious and civil groups, in downtown Seoul. Representatives from seven main religions in South Korea submitted together ‘the Special Bill on Abolishing the Death Penalty’ to the National Assembly. Cooperating with other groups works greatly to the advantage of the Catholic Church, as it enhances solidarity within South Korean civil society, where a strong base of society is needed to deepen democratic values and practice among civil groups and citizens. However, the research discovers that there is far more cooperation between Catholic Church and other religions and NGOs at the local level.

---

Local Ecclesial-societal Relations

CEB carries a role of structuring civil society at grassroots level, and constituting new social actors, such as neighbourhood associations, labour unions or political parties. Krischke interviewed 40 leaders of regional boards of the movement in the different areas of Sao Paulo. They say the church has four contribution in developing local organisations and social movements. First, the church is a strategic channel to overcome neighbourhoods’ social and cultural heterogeneity as the church transcends the specific differences among residents. Second, the church provides an entrance point to and institutional support for the movement. Thirdly, the church’s network is a part of a social arena occupied by popular organisations, which goes beyond the limits of their neighbourhood. Last but not least, it is the convergence between church’s influences and the use of participatory methods of local organisation. It means that the local church often took up methods of democratic resocialisation to support the residents’ struggle to realize their citizenship.52

However, because of the rivalry between the Brazilian Catholic Church and Protestant churches, CEB and local Catholic Church rarely cooperate with the Protestants in deepening democracy. While we found a close relationship between CEBs and local groups and NGOs, there is no collaboration between CEBs and other local Protestant groups. It leads to a fact that there are no obvious Christian coalitions in developing democratic civil society and empowering local citizens in a coherent sense. That is why Sinner comments the non-cooperation between Christian churches that is, if ecumenical cooperation could work better in Brazil, a stronger

52 Krischke.
contribution would be made by these churches together rather than against each other.53

Unlike Brazil, the local churches of South Korea have close collaboration with Protestant churches and Buddhist monks in social and religious mobilisation. Forming coalition for particular issues with other religious groups is a way to empower individual participants and groups with shared networks and resources, and to encourage civic engagements backed by solidarity of the civil society groups. Furthermore, since a coalition consists of groups from different ideological, cultural and religious background, it makes plural forms of expressions and actions in the movement possible.

An example was the movement of saving Saemangeum Tidal Flat in 2001, in which the local Catholics, Buddhists and Protestants worked hand in hand. It is a movement demanding the cancellation of a large-scale reclamation project. On March 14, 2001, some 500 Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists and Won Buddhists held a prayer service at the Buddhist Chogye temple in Seoul and marched to protest against the reclamation plan.54 On May 25, 2001, before the authorities announced the final decision on the project, a Catholic priest and a Buddhist Monk declared themselves against the project and the practiced the "Three Steps One Bow" ascetic prayer. It is a Buddhist ascetic practice, the first step of which is to repent of selfishness and greed, the second step of which is to arouse compassion for all living beings and the third step of which is for a commitment that one will help to save all suffering beings. The three

53 Sinner, p. 254.
steps are symbolic acts of overcoming Greed, Anger and Stupidity, the so-called three anguishes that harm the goodness of humans in Buddhism. The one bow represents one's own repentance for neglecting life. However, the authorities went forward with the construction. Thus in 2003, four ascetics of four religions, including Roman Catholic Church, Buddhism, Won Buddhism and Presbyterian Church went on a pilgrimage from Tidal Flat to Seoul covering 309 km over 65 days, practicing the ‘3 Steps 1 Bow’ again. The march created a big response as time passed, and promoted the national movement for protection of life and environment across the country.  

**Intra-ecclesial Relations**

In Brazil, the relationship between CEBs and the national Catholic Church is that it has become indifferent after democratic transition. On one hand, CNBB recognized CEBs’ contribution to Brazilian Church and Society through an official statement in 2010. But on the other, CNBB has long kept its distance from CEBs in deepening democracy since transition was completed. According to Hewitt, references to the CEBs per se in official documents since late 1980s are almost non-existent. The term CEB, in fact, is rarely used in major documents of CNBB. What frequently appears in its place is the generic ‘church communities’ (comunidade ecclesial), which

---


refers not only to CEBs, but dioceses, parishes, families, or Church-related associations or movements.\(^{57}\)

The reason was the decline of the progressiveness of CNBB after transition. The replacement of bishops by the Vatican, and the rise of Brazilian civil society brought CNBB a step back. It had a dramatic effect on the way that the CEBs and their role have come to be conceptualised by the upper hierarchy. The lack of emphasis on the CEBs had brought a severe lack of both the moral and material support required to keep the CEBs involved in social political affairs since the late 1980s. Furthermore, many members of CEBs left to political parties and trade unions. The loss of leadership had resulted in lack of activation of community projects in Sao Paulo.\(^{58}\)

In South Korea, the relationships between local (CPAJ and local parishes) and national Catholic Church (CBCK and the bishops of the dioceses in South Korea) are not always in harmony. The tensions between the two levels of Catholic Church mainly lie between CBCK and CPAJ, in which the latter is not endorsed by CBCK.

The first example is the fasting campaign against the National Security Law in 2004, in which I have discussed previously. Despite the fact that 33 Church-based human rights groups, including 8 diocesan justice and peace committees, have joined his solidarity group, CBCK did not express its stance in the issue. One of the fasting priest openly criticized CBCK that their silence was "not performing their prophetic roles is obvious neglect of their duty". However, only a retired archbishop of Seoul expressed that he


\(^{58}\) Ibid., pp.147-9.

- 196 -
favored revision, not abolition, of the security law.\textsuperscript{59} In this case, the tension occurred because of the lack of verbal support on local priests’ actions from CBCK.

The second example refers to the suspicion of which the leader of CPAJ was forced to stop his duty after the release of ‘Samsung Scandal’ since 2008. In October 2007, a retired head of Samsung’s legal division, and members of CPAJ went on live television to charge that the bribes of Samsung went well beyond prosecutors and included government officials.\textsuperscript{60} The release shocked around the country, and the National Assembly eventually passed a bill to activate special investigation.\textsuperscript{61} Yet in the following year, a priest, who was the president of CPAJ, was given a sabbatical year that his official duties are ceased by the order of the Bishop of Seoul. Media reported that the priest’s involvements in social issues, in particular the US$200 million Samsung slush fund scandal, had also made him unpopular with the Church hierarchy. His sabbatical year was extended twice to 2010. The decision of Cardinal Cheong, the Bishop of Seoul, was widely criticised as the priest declared that he did not want to have sabbatical years on one hand, and on the other a priest judged the Archdiocese of Seoul in television program that an

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Section of the archdiocesan foundation of Seoul had also received lots of donation from Samsung, and the public associate it with the sabbatical order of the Cardinal.62

What CPAJ did was an obvious instance of how civil society checks and balances the corruption of state power, and a meaningful example for individual citizens and groups to follow. But the absolute order by the Cardinal of Seoul not only spread a public perception that the church authority is not on the side of the people, but also threatened the priests’ level of engagement in social affairs. The inconsistency between the national and local Catholic Church may become an obstacle to mobilise the faithful as they could be confused by the different stances taken by the national and local Catholic Church on social political issues and the resulting actions.

**Evaluation**

The divisions between national and local level of this study enable us to understand the commonalities and differences between the ecclesial actions and relations between Brazil and South Korea.

In the national level, the Catholic Church in Brazil (CNBB) and South Korea (CBCK) are common three ways. Firstly, both of them frame the mission of the Church relates to social and political engagement. While CNBB elevates itself to be a moral watchdog of Brazilian politics, CBCK displays itself as a strong figure in political engagement.

---

and social affairs in South Korea. Secondly, both of them utilise their resources in terms of organisation, network, and material, to support both national social campaigns and local groups. Thirdly, they make use of the opportunities of general elections in both countries to address their concerns, monitor candidates and raise the awareness and involvement of citizens in electoral democratic politics.

The differences between CNBB and CBCK are twofold. The first difference is issues of concern. While CNBB focuses on economic and social justice, CBCK concerns death penalty and environmental protection more. The reason is historical. Brazil has long been under serious economic inequalities, and economic justice was the major concern of citizen. In the case of South Korea, on one hand, people have long been suffered from fierce military rule and brutal suppressions, thus they have greater desire of right to life, which often contradicts action of death penalty; on the other, passed the stage of modernisation, South Korea becomes a developed country, and people begin to concern more of post-material issues, such as ecology. The second difference lies on the relationship between Catholic Churches and other religion. While CNBB maintains a cooperative relationships with NGOs but not the Church; CBCK co-opt with other groups and had often cooperated with other protestant churches for general social and political concerns.

In the local level, we can find three distinctive comparisons between Brazilian and South Korean local Catholic Churches. First of all, in terms of mobilisation we can see the local Church in South Korea is more progressive than that of Brazil. CPAJ and local parishes often take radical actions and critical mobilisations to challenge the government and empower local citizens, while the local Brazilian Church organisations like CEBs stepped back to support civil society by resources and exporting civic leaders.
Secondly, their relations between local Church organisations and other religions or NGOs are different. For South Korea, the local Church organisations are closely tied with Protestant organisations, Buddhist groups and NGOs to engage in social and political affairs. They cooperate on an equal base. However, despite their sharp decline of political significance, CEBs are leading groups among their NGO partners. This is because CEBs has the reputation and experience in social movement since the military era, and they are capable of flourishing other NGOs or local groups to strengthen civil society.

Thirdly, the relationships between national and local Church in South Korea is even more tense and contentious than that of Brazil. In Brazil, CNBB in general takes an indifferent attitude towards CEBs today, despite a certain degree of appreciation CNBB showed in few official statements. However, in South Korea CBCK and CPAJ often have tensions, when the latter group radically challenged the government and even the Church authority. These events often lead to some decisions made by CBCK which is not in favour of CPAJ, and tensions are intensified at the end.

While the Brazilian Catholic Church leans toward the solidarity model of civil society, the South Korean Church inclines to the critical one. In Brazil, both CNBB and CEBs prefer to promote civic engagement and empowerment of citizenship by non-confrontational means, since they are not aimed against the state or other social agents, but at empowering participants of the campaigns or programmes offered by the Church, thus strengthening solidarity in society. However, the Catholic Church in South Korea is more critical of the government. The CBCK often challenges government laws and policies by its official statements associating their concerns with the Church’s teaching. The local Catholic Church organizations such as CPAJ are even more radical. They plan
different social or religious actions to attract public and media attention on current issues, and pressure the relevant government agencies to compromise. Citizens can engage in these church-based campaigns and collective actions, and they can be empowered by exercising their political rights in public assembly.

Another obvious finding is that the population of the Catholic faithful has effects on the roles and forms of mobilizations of the Catholic Church. The majority of Brazilian citizens are Catholic. But it takes less contentious measures in deepening democracy and the CNBB and CEBs of Brazil are unwilling to collaborate with Pentecostal groups on the work of deepening democracy. In contrast, although the Catholic Church is a minority in South Korea, it is more critical of the state, and is more cooperative with other religions in promoting civic engagement and empowering citizens. CBCK and CPAJ are always willing to cooperate and support other Protestant churches and even Buddhist monks in social movements.

The reasons are twofold. Firstly, when the Catholic Church is a minority in society, it would be easier to cooperate with other religions since they understand that a strong coalition contributes to both the work of consolidating civil society and their growth of significance. However, when the Catholic Church is the majority, it regards other religions as rivals instead of partners. Thus, maintaining its social and even political significance, and preventing the growth of rivals becomes a major task for the Catholic Church.

The second reason refers to the historical development of the Catholic Church in the two countries. The Catholic Church in Brazil was a collaborator with the colonial government, but became aligned with the opposition when the Military regime began. Once democracy was installed in Brazil, the Church began to step back from the frontline of fighting for democracy. The reason might be that the Church wanted to resume a normal relationship with the state.
On the contrary, since Buddhist monks, Protestant pastors and the Catholic priests had long partnerships in fighting against the military government of South Korea, they built a strong coalition for checking and balancing the state power. The solidarity of religions in civil society overcomes the problem of being a minority religion, which is assumed to have less influence in public affairs.

**Conclusion**

This article aimed to discover the role of the Catholic Church in deepening democracy by a comparative analysis between the Church in Brazil and South Korea. The case studies support the early-provided theoretical framework that civil society, using either a critical or solidarity model, deepens democracy through civil engagement, empowerment of citizenship and multiple forms of democratic practices to internalize democratic norms and values, and prevent alienation of democracy. The Catholic Church, as a member of civil society, contributes to deepening democracy by its own doctrine, which frames the justification of their social and political involvement, its resources for mobilizations, and its strategies that utilise political opportunities at both the national and local level. It also cooperates and builds coalitions with many local NGOs and even religious organizations for a greater influence in their social and political engagements. In sum, the Church in South Korea is more progressive in deepening democracy, although it owns only a small portion of Catholic faithful in the country. Religion, in particular the Roman Catholic Church, is still influential in public affairs and politics. The article also reveals that relations between the national and local levels of the Catholic Church, the inter-religious relationships and the relationship between state, business and religion are worth further researching. The author sincerely hopes that more
scholars will continue to study the dynamics between the Catholic Church, civil society and democracy, and thus evaluate her mission of building heavenly kingdom on Earth.

**Further Readings**


[摘要] 民主化之後的鞏固民主過程，既包括國家和社會中民主準則和價值觀的體制化和內化，亦包括公民個人的內化。因此，通過民間的參與，公民充權和多種形式的民主實踐，公民社會在「深化民主」方面起著重要角色。在第三波民主化的過程中，天主教教會被視為支持自由民主的一股積極力量。然而，羅馬天主教會在深化民主角色方面的文獻需要擴展。透過比較分析巴西和韓國的教會，本文討論了天主教會深化民主的角色。透過社會和政治參與的教義、動員的資源，以及運用國家和地方層面的政治機遇的策略，作為民間社會的一員的天主教教會，在深化民主上作出了貢獻。它還與許多當地非政府組織以至宗教組織合作，試圖在社會和政治參與上發揮較大影響力。通過比較韓國和巴西天主教教會的行為，筆者強調，除了策略和信徒的大小，三種模式的動態對繼續研究該領域起著重要作用，即國家和地方之間的天主教教會的關係、宗教之間的關係，以及國家、企業與宗教之間的關係。